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FORTUITY VICTIMS AND THE COMPENSATION GAP:
RE-ENVISIONING LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE
FOR INTENTIONAL AND CRIMINAL CONDUCT
ERIK S. KNUTSEN†1
***
Insurance is based on the notion that only uncertain, or fortuitous,
losses are insurable. There are systemic problems, however, with the
consistency in which fortuity clauses are applied in the liability insurance
context. Differing interpretive approaches and litigation distortions
include the use of at least three interpretive perspectives and two
substantive requirements to interpret the intentional act fortuity clause, and
four interpretive perspectives to interpret the criminal act fortuity clause.
These problems stem from the tension between the two purposes of liability
insurance (wealth protection and victim compensation) coupled with a
move from explanatory rhetoric about fortuity to explanatory rhetoric
about morality.
This Article outlines the importance of balancing that tension and
examines the problematic effects of these two ubiquitous fortuity clauses
that remove coverage for policyholders and simultaneously deny access to
compensatory funds for injured victims. The Article argues that intentional
and criminal act fortuity clauses need to be more consistently interpreted to
avoid a host of inefficient distortion effects that otherwise result from the
introduction of moral concerns, and it concludes by offering possible
solutions for redress for those accident victims that would still be left,
though more predictably, in the liability insurance compensation gap.
***
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It surprises many that an accident victim who is hurt as a result of a
wrongdoer’s intentional or criminal actions often receives no compensation
from a tort lawsuit. In fact, tort lawsuits are rarely brought for these kinds
of injuries. The reason is because the wrongdoer’s liability insurance
policy typically excludes insurance coverage for losses arising from the
wrongdoer policyholder’s intentional or criminal actions. There is thus no
money available for the victim’s compensation. These are often the most
morally disturbing kinds of injuries because, in most instances, the
wrongdoer meant to harm the victim. It was no “accident.” So why does
liability insurance pay an injured accident victim when the policyholder
causes an accident but not when the policyholder acts intentionally or
criminally? More importantly, what if the policyholder acted intentionally
or criminally and still caused an “accident?”
What if the policyholder did not mean to harm the victim? This
can occur in a variety of ways. A policyholder could be playing a prank to
scare a friend. The prank gets out of hand and the friend is injured. But the
policyholder never means to harm the friend. Did the policyholder act
“intentionally” and therefore there should be no liability insurance
coverage available to him if the friend sues him for compensation? What if
the policyholder’s actions violate a criminal law and the policyholder is
charged with a crime arising out of the prank behavior? Should there be no
liability insurance coverage then? And what is the injured friend to do for
compensation, without the policyholder’s financial safety net of liability
insurance to access?
This Article examines the problematic effects of two ubiquitous
fortuity clauses in liability insurance: a clause which removes coverage for
intentionally caused losses and one which removes coverage for losses
arising from a policyholder’s criminal acts. A fortuity clause is insurance
policy language designed to remove coverage for non-fortuitous risks. The
fortuity clause controls access to insurance coverage for a liability
insurance policyholder while simultaneously controlling access to
compensatory funds for the injured accident victim who sues the
wrongdoer policyholder.
Intentional and criminal act fortuity clauses are interpreted in a
highly inconsistent fashion by courts and litigators, making insurance cases
hinging on the clauses costly and unpredictable to litigate. Litigants have
also devised creative but costly litigation distortions as workarounds for
avoiding the operation of these clauses. This, in turn, has resulted in a
large group of injured accident victims who face a compensation gap as a
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result of courts’ and litigants’ inconsistent fortuity clause interpretation.
The population of accident victims within the compensation gap is
constantly expanding and contracting with the whims of varying fortuity
clause interpretations. These accident victims are “fortuity victims.” This
makes finding a solution to this compensation gap doubly problematic for
this group of injured accident victims because it is difficult to categorize, at
any one time, which victims will be left uncompensated. While liability
insurance does not, and cannot, provide coverage for every loss, there is
something slippery about the fact that identically-worded fortuity clauses
are interpreted to have different effects in different cases, despite
remarkably similar factual circumstances in those cases.
Interpreting fortuity clauses in the liability insurance context is
unpredictably problematic because the interpretive exercise is affected by
the tension between two co-existing purposes of liability insurance: wealth
protection and accident compensation. These purposes often cancel each
other out, leaving the injured accident victim without compensation – a
serious collateral effect. At the same time, because these fortuity clauses
target intentional and criminal conduct, there is incentive for improper and
misleading introduction of moral concerns into the interpretation. The
fortuity clause can morph into a morality clause, with a host of inefficient
distortion effects. To avoid these problems, there should be a more
consistent interpretive solution which firmly grounds the intentional and
criminal act fortuity clauses in fortuity concepts, not morality concepts.
This would go a long way to bettering the accident compensation system as
a whole by removing the unpredictability about which fortuity victims are
left in the compensation gap. Once that occurs, there can then be a more
efficient accounting as to where certain societal losses will ultimately lie –
with insurers, wrongdoers, or society’s social safety net.
Part I of this Article explains how fortuity is fundamental to the
insurance relationship. Insurance can only insure against uncertain risks.
Part II explains how liability insurance operates within the tort system and
introduces the tension between liability insurance’s two often-competing
purposes: a wealth protection vehicle for the policyholder and a vital and
expected component of society’s accident compensation web. In Part III,
the Article focuses on two common liability insurance fortuity clauses, the
intentional and criminal act fortuity clauses. The problems created by
courts’ and litigants’ current interpretation of these fortuity clauses is dealt
with in Part IV. Part V explains the causes of these problems, tracing how
the historically moral nature of the clauses affects their interpretation in
today’s modern insurance world, which is focused on risk management, not
morality. Part VI introduces an interpretive solution for the intentional and
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criminal act fortuity clauses. Part VII addresses some possibilities for
redress for those accident victims still left in the liability insurance
compensation gap after the solution is applied. Part VIII concludes with a
reminder that better predictability and consistency in insurance coverage
results can be maintained if fortuity clauses remain grounded in fortuity,
not morality.
II.

INSURANCE AND FORTUITY

A standard tenet of insurance is that it is designed to protect a
policyholder against losses that are fortuitous.2 It is typically not
economically sensible for insurers to offer protection for losses that are
certain to happen.3 The insurance arrangement between insurer and
policyholder depends on the insurer shouldering some potential risk that a
future covered event may or may not occur. The insurer profits from the
superior ability to better estimate the likelihood of a future payouttriggering occurrence and balance that risk with the amount of insurance
premium charged to the policyholder who wishes her risk to be
underwritten by the insurer. The premium paid is usually a fraction of the
actual cost of a future expected loss. By pooling together multiple
policyholders who wish similar risks underwritten, the insurer is able to
ride the waves of random (or fortuitous) future payouts and, owing to the
law of large numbers, profit from the fact that not everyone will experience
a payout-triggering loss at once. The insurer is thus taking on two risks: (1)
2

JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS 37–68 (3d ed.
2006); Kenneth S. Abraham, Peril and Fortuity in Property and Liability
Insurance, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 777, 777 (2001); James A. Fischer, The Exclusion
from Insurance Coverage of Losses Caused by the Intentional Acts of the Insured:
A Policy in Search of a Justification, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 96 (1990);
George L. Priest, Insurability and Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1020–
25 (1989); see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 771,
789 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Gen. Housewares Corp. v. Nat’l Sur. Corp., 741 N.E.2d
408, 413 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); United Capitol Ins. Co. v. Hoodco, Inc., 974
S.W.2d 572, 576 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Travis, 68 S.W.3d 72,
75 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 998
P.2d 856, 878–79 (Wash. 2000).
3
Indeed, some states have statutory prohibitions against insurance coverage
for willful acts. See CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 2013) (“An insurer is not liable
for a loss caused by the willful act of the insured; but he [the insurer] is not
exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or of the insured’s agents or others.”).
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the risk of a future event occurring, which would trigger payout to a
policyholder, and (2) the risk that not every policyholder in the risk pool
will require a payout at once.
The insurer’s risk shouldering in exchange for a policyholder’s
premium breaks down as a commercially sensible arrangement if a
policyholder attempts to have an insurer underwrite a risk that the
policyholder knows he is certain to realize. In that case, there is no risk
transfer at all. In exchange for a small fraction of the cost of the loss, the
policyholder would be made whole because the insurer makes up the
difference. No insurer could profit from that arrangement. To that end,
insurance is based on the notion that insurable risks must be uncertain, or
fortuitous, ones.
III.

WHAT IS LIABILITY INSURANCE?

Most liability insurance policies marketed today provide a
policyholder with coverage for a wide variety of loss-causing behavior.
Standard liability insurance policies include homeowners’ policies which
protect the policyholder from liability for a broad spectrum of potential
losses, commercial liability policies which provide protection against
liability resulting from business operations, and automobile liability
policies which protect drivers from legal liability for accidents that result
from use of their vehicle. Liability insurance can be understood as a kind
of “tort” insurance, or “behavior” insurance.4 If the policyholder does
something (like a tort) that results in her being sued by another third party
for losses she caused, liability insurance steps in to do two things. First, it
provides for a legal defense for the policyholder. Second, if, as a result of
the lawsuit, the policyholder is found legally liable to pay for the loss to a
third party, the liability insurance policy provides funds to compensate that
wronged third party, up to the financial limits of the policy. Liability
insurance provides policyholders protection against paying for both
property and personal injury damages to a third party. The focus in this
Article is on personal injury cases where the policyholder has injured a
third party victim. However, the same issues arise when policyholders
become legally liable to pay for third party property damages. The
compensatory gap issues are, however, markedly different (and arguably
less compelling) in property loss instances. The injury is then not one of
4

Erik S. Knutsen, Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for
Catastrophic Losses, 61 ALA. L. REV. 957, 963 (2010).
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loss of life and limb, but of property. Society’s web of accident
compensation sources does not really attempt to address property losses in
a holistic fashion.
A key notion for this Article is that, although the liability insurance
policy is marketed and drafted by the insurer to protect the policyholder
from legal liability to a third party, the financial payout from the liability
insurance policy ultimately goes to the third party victim who suffered the
loss at the hands of the policyholder. If John’s negligence results in him
injuring Mary and thus he is liable to pay for Mary’s injury, John’s liability
insurer pays Mary compensation for her injury. This mechanism creates a
tension as to the purpose of liability insurance itself. Is liability insurance
to be merely a wealth protection mechanism for the insured policyholder,
so that, in the event he is sued for some loss-causing behavior, he does not
have to call upon his own assets (if any) to pay for the loss? Or is liability
insurance instead to be the largest player in the broader societal web of
accident compensation in that it often acts as the sole source of reparation
for an injured victim?5 This tension becomes relevant when courts attempt
to discern whether or not a policyholder has coverage under an insurance
policy, because the effect of that decision is ultimately felt not only by the
policyholder (and sometimes not at all, if the policyholder is impecunious),
but by the wronged accident victim seeking redress. It is most stark when
the victim suffers personal injuries and often has nowhere satisfactory to
turn to for much-needed compensation.
The coverage provided by liability insurance policies is typically
very broad.6 For example, the coverage clause in a liability insurance
policy usually provides coverage for all damages or injury for which the
policyholder becomes “legally obligated to pay.” This breadth of coverage
makes sense because there are a myriad of combinations of human
behavior that could lead up to a policyholder’s legal liability to pay for a
third party’s loss. To that end, because liability insurance provides such
broad-spectrum coverage, insurers must rely on wording within the
insurance policy to delineate what categories of behaviors or losses are not
covered. Of course, insurers wish to exclude losses that result from non5

See generally Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways
that Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2005).
6
See, e.g., Klepper v. ACE American Ins. Co., 999 N.E.2d 86, 91 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013) (“[We] will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated
to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this
insurance applies.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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fortuitous events because these events frustrate the fundamental nature of
the insurance arrangement.7
IV.

FORTUITY CLAUSES

Two categories of losses that are commonly excluded from
standard liability insurance coverage are losses resulting from the
intentional acts or from the criminal acts of the policyholder. These losses
can be excluded using variously worded insurance clauses. These “fortuity
clauses”8 are ultimately aimed at targeting behavior that undermines the
risk-sharing relationship between insurer and policyholder. A fortuity
clause delineates those certain categories of behavior that produce nonfortuitous, and thus uninsurable, losses. The fortuity clause most prevalent
in liability insurance policies is an “intentional act” fortuity clause, which
excludes from coverage those losses “either expected or intended from the
standpoint of the insured.”9 Alternatively, the intentional act fortuity clause
could be worded as to remove coverage for losses resulting from a
policyholder’s intentional acts.10 Occasionally, the removal of coverage for
intentional acts could be through reference to a definition contained in the
liability policy’s coverage clause. Some liability policies provide coverage
for legal liability resulting from an “occurrence,” which is then typically
defined as an “accident.”11 The policy then excludes intentionally caused
7

See, e.g., Bailey v. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 255 P.3d 1039, 1047 (Colo. 2011)
(finding intentional act exclusions necessary for insurers in setting rates and
providing coverage and that the purpose of insurance is violated should
policyholder be allowed to intentionally control losses).
8
See generally Erik S. Knutsen, Fortuity Clauses in Liability Insurance:
Solving Coverage Dilemmas for Intentional and Criminal Conduct, 37 QUEEN’S
L.J. 73 (2011).
9
See, e.g., Capano Mgmt. Co. v. Transcon. Ins. Co., 78 F. Supp. 2d 320, 323
(D. Del. 1999) (noting that the “expected or intended” element of the exclusion is
at issue); see also Hirst v. Thieneman, 2004-0750, p. 12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/18/05);
905 So. 2d 343, 351 (noting that the “expected or intended” exclusion is
commonly referred to as the “intentional act” exclusion).
10
See, e.g., Thomas v. Benchmark Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 438, 442 (Kan. Ct. App.
2006) (holding that an automobile liability policy excludes “damage or injury
‘caused intentionally’”); see also Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dyer, 170 F. Supp.
2d 618, 621 (W.D. Va. 2001) (holding coverage is excluded if insured acted “with
the intent to cause a loss”).
11
See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Doe, 946 P.2d 1333, 1335 (Idaho
1997) (holding that a homeowner’s liability policy provided coverage for “personal
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losses. In this fashion, insurers fold an exclusion into the definition of
words used in a coverage clause: “occurrence” or “accident.”
The second common fortuity clause is a “criminal act” fortuity
clause which removes coverage for losses resulting from a policyholder’s
criminal act, 12 “violation of a penal statute or ordinance,” or some criminal
conduct.13
At first blush, losses resulting from criminal and intentional acts of
the policyholder may appear to be among the most fortuity-frustrating
kinds of behavior that an insurer would want to avoid insuring. A death
resulting from a premeditated murder or a burned factory resulting from a
premeditated arson hardly appear to be fortuitous events. Surely the
policyholder has control over whether the loss transpires or not. But what
about losses arising when the policyholder is criminally negligent while
causing a loss such that she attracts a criminal charge for substandard
behavior, like negligently handling a firearm and an accidental discharge
harms a third party?14 Are those losses really “criminal” and thus nonfortuitous and uninsurable? Or what about losses arising from a prank
injury” caused by an “occurrence” (which is then defined as an “accident”) but
finding an exclusion if policyholder acted with “intent to cause personal injury”);
see also Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1262–63 (N.J. 1992)
(finding that homeowners’ liability policy covered legal liability arising from an
occurrence (which is defined as an “accident”) and finding that coverage excluded
that of “insureds whose conduct is intentionally-wrongful”).
12
Cf. Wilshire Ins. Co. v. S.A., 227 P.3d 504, 506 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010);
SECURA Supreme Ins. Co. v. M.S.M., 755 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Minn. Ct. App.
2008).
13
See, e.g., Wilderman v. Powers, 956 A.2d 613, 616 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008)
(finding no coverage when occurrence is the result of a “violation of a penal law or
ordinance . . . .”); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Condon, 839 N.E.2d 464, 469
(Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (finding no coverage when occurrence is the result of a
“willful violation of a penal statute.”); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Zavala, 302 F.
Supp. 2d 1108, 1124 (D. Ariz. 2003) (finding no coverage when an occurrence is
the result of a “violation of any criminal law for which any insured is
convicted[.]”).
14
See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Berube, 854 A.2d 53, 54–55 (Conn. App. Ct.
2004) (taking a loaded, sawed-off rifle to bed with his wife and two-month-old
daughter and unintentionally shooting his wife); Auto Club Group Ins. Co. v.
Booth, 797 N.W.2d 695, 696–97 (Mich. App. 2010) (injuring another teen where
firearm accidentally discharged); Eichmanis v. Wawanesa Mut. Ins. Co. (2007),
278 D.L.R. 4th 15, para. 9 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (playing with a firearm when it
accidentally discharges, teen injures another teen).
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where a policyholder intends to scare a third party and that third party gets
injured? Does the “intentional act” fortuity clause oust coverage when the
policyholder subjectively acts with intent to cause a loss, or is an objective
or some hybrid standard to be used? For example, if a college student’s
friends pile toilet paper on the sleeping student and then light the paper on
fire as a prank, but the student is injured, are those losses really
“intentional” or “expected” and thus non-fortuitous and uninsurable?15
V.

PROBLEMS: UNPREDICTABILITY AND COMPENSATION
GAPS

The examples above highlight the two major problems with the
ways the intentional and criminal act fortuity clauses are interpreted by
courts, insurers, and policyholders attempting to solve insurance coverage
disputes. The first problem is that past courts’ interpretations of the clauses
have often led to unpredictable and inconsistent results. There are opposite
case outcomes for similar cases featuring similarly worded fortuity clauses.
For example, some courts have held that a policyholder’s act of selfdefense which injures a third party is not covered behavior by a liability
policy because the policyholder has intended to injure the victim.16 Other
courts, however, have held that self-defense bars the application of an
intentional acts fortuity clause.17 Some of these courts have also determined
that coverage will be ousted for “unreasonable acts” of self-defense.18
15

See generally Godonoaga v. Khatambakhsh (2000), 188 D.L.R. 4th 706
(Can. Ont. C.A.) (concluding that fortuity clause did not exclude coverage for
parents’ negligent actions in allowing children to commit intentional assault).
16
See, e.g., L.A. Checker Cab Co-op., Inc. v. First Specialty Ins. Co., 112 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 335, 337–38 (2010) (finding loss to be intentional, and thus excluded,
where cab driver believed he had to defend himself and as such he shot passenger
who provoked him).
17
See, e.g., Vermont Mut. Ins. Co. v. Singleton, 446 S.E.2d 417, 420–21 (S.C.
1994) (finding no intent to injure when policyholder defended himself in fist fight
because he was only trying to protect himself); see also Farmers & Mechanics
Mut. Ins. Co. of W. Va. v. Cook, 557 S.E.2d 801, 810 (W. Va. 2001) (finding loss
resulting from self-defense “not expected or intended by the policyholder”).
18
See, e.g., Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 538 N.W.2d 106, 110 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1995) (denying coverage where policyholder shot a man who acted in an
aggressively frightening manner and who climbed the policyholder’s wall and
finding policyholder did not act reasonably as the aggressor was unarmed and
police were not called).
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Unpredictability is harmful for the insurer, the policyholder, and
the wronged accident victim. If no one can tell, up front, when a fortuity
clause in a liability insurance policy will or will not oust coverage for a
loss, litigation can become protracted and expensive as each party attempts
to stress a different interpretation of the same clause. Insurers are thus
often unable to predict both their financial exposure on an individual basis
for these types of losses and additionally their exposure over a large risk
pool. Policyholders are often unable to predict what types of behavior will
remove coverage for a loss, thus making it difficult for them to adjust their
actions so they remain covered for potential legal liability. Wronged
accident victims are unable to predictably expect compensation because the
question is too often driven by an insurance lawsuit about the
policyholder’s liability insurance coverage. This has resulted in increased
litigation costs for all parties involved and has prompted inefficient
litigation workarounds that attempt to circumvent the unpredictable
application of these clauses.
The second problem with interpreting fortuity clauses is that many
courts are ignoring the fact that the wronged accident victim’s expected
compensation hangs in the balance in virtually every decision about
fortuity clauses and insurance coverage. When these clauses are triggered
and payment is denied to a policyholder, and thus to an injured victim, the
compensatory gap left is not routinely addressed anywhere else in the
patchwork web of sources comprising the accident compensation system.19
Those accident costs do not disappear simply because a policyholder is
denied coverage. They must be absorbed elsewhere, and often in very
inefficient ways. Therefore, any denial of liability insurance coverage
needs to be done in a principled and measured fashion, carefully weighed
against its effect on the wronged accident victim who likely will have few
avenues to turn to for financial assistance. To that end, it becomes
important to develop a better way to deal with fortuity clauses which
produces predictable and fair results for policyholders, insurers, and
accident victims.

19

See Ellen S. Pryor, Part of the Whole: Tort Law’s Compensatory Failures
Through a Wider Lens, 27 REV. LITIG. 307, 317–18 (2008); see also Erik S.
Knutsen, Five Things Wrong with Personal Injury Litigation (And What to Do
About It!), 40 ADVOCATES Q. 492, 495–96 (2013).
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UNPREDICTABILITY

Unpredictability breeds litigation. Many litigants disputing fortuity
clause interpretations – insurers and policyholders alike – are incentivized
to remain in litigation up to the appeals stage because of the possibility that
they will obtain an interpretive finding favorable to them. This costly
unpredictability is exacerbated in the fortuity clause context in two ways:
interpretive unpredictability and litigation distortion from costly
workarounds.
1.

Interpretive Unpredictability
a.

Intentional Act Fortuity Clause

Courts attempting to apply the intentional act fortuity clause to
make coverage determinations have devised three very different ways of
interpreting this clause, each with differing coverage results. This has
occurred despite a major rewording of the standard clause in most
commercial general liability policies in an attempt to address this very
problem. Once worded as an “intentional acts” exclusion, the CGL fortuity
clause now ousts coverage for losses “expected or intended” from the
standpoint of the policyholder.20
Some courts interpreting the intentional act fortuity clause utilize
an objective interpretive perspective. This perspective removes liability
insurance coverage if a reasonable policyholder should have known that
damage or injury would result from her conduct.21 This perspective is
problematic because it ousts coverage for behavior that some policyholders
clearly expect would not lead to damage or injury (or they probably would
20

See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 2, at 73; see also infra p. 14.
See, e.g., Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Puig, 64 F. Supp. 2d 514, 518–19 (D. Md.
1999) (finding no coverage because, even if policyholder subjectively did not
intend injury when he kicked in a washroom stall door to deliver a “wake-up call”
to the occupant, it was “reasonably expected” that door would hit and injure
occupant); Scott v. Allstate Indem. Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d 929, 936 (N.D. Ohio
2006) (finding no coverage where policyholder held a match to a wet substance to
see if it is flammable because it should be reasonably expected that fire would
result); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Moore, No. 266721, 2006 WL 891078, at *1, *2–
*3 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2006) (finding no coverage when child lit a lighter near
gasoline-soaked pants, even though intent was to light a fire near leg, because fire
was natural, foreseeable, and anticipated consequence of actions).
21

220

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 21.1

not have behaved that way in the first place). A policyholder cannot adjust
ex ante her behavior to avoid losing insurance coverage if she cannot
reliably predict what behavior leads to coverage loss. In operation, the
clause therefore removes coverage for some behavior that is risky and
fortuitous but not subjectively intentional. Because liability insurance is
supposed to provide coverage for fortuitous behavior, this is an
incongruous result.22
Some courts appear to apply a middle-ground hybrid interpretive
perspective, where coverage is ousted when the policyholder intended
some injury, but the resulting loss was greater than expected.23 This
perspective exhibits the same problem as the objective interpretive
perspective but on a sliding scale. Once the policyholder’s conduct is
judged by objective reasonable standards, some fortuitous conduct will not
be covered. Under the objective and hybrid perspectives, policyholder
behavior will be over-deterred because coverage is dependent not on the
policyholder’s subjective and controllable intent, but on an objective, third
party view of what conduct is reasonable. When that view differs from the
policyholder’s (which it does in nearly all of these cases, or a policyholder
probably would not have behaved a certain way), a policyholder lacks
predictable coverage information to assist in determining how to behave so
as to remain within liability coverage protection. Furthermore, litigants in
insurance coverage disputes will differ as to what types of conduct appear
“reasonable” or not. This fuels the litigation.
Finally, some courts use a subjective interpretive perspective to
hold that coverage is not ousted unless the policyholder actually expected
or intended the loss.24 This perspective offers the most predictable
22

ROBERT H. JERRY & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE
LAW 460 (4th ed. 2007).
23
See, e.g., Canterberry v. Chamblee, 41, 940, p. 6 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2/27/07);
953 So. 2d 900, 904 (finding no coverage where boy intended to fight even though
he did not intend to break victim’s nose); Hatmaker v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
308 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (finding no coverage where
policyholder threw victim to ground and punched him in head, even though
policyholder did not intend to cause any injuries); Harleysville Ins. Cos. v. Garitta,
785 A.2d 913, 923 (N.J. 2001) (finding no coverage where the policyholder
stabbed victim twice and pled guilty to third-degree murder even though
policyholder had not intended to cause death).
24
See, e.g., Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Kenway Contracting, Inc., 240 S.W.3d
633, 640 (Ky. 2007) (finding coverage where policyholder conducted a demolition
and tore down entire residential structure instead of the intended carport because
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approach to the intentional act fortuity clause because it is the only
approach that removes coverage when a policyholder’s behavior results in
a non-fortuitous loss. A policyholder knows where she stands vis-à-vis
coverage: if she intends the loss, coverage will not attach.
To complicate matters further, courts split further as to what must
be intended by the policyholder: the intentional action alone25 or both the
intentional action and the resultant injury.26 For example, even though a
child may have intended to light a fire as a prank, if no damage was
intended, liability for the resulting fire loss would be covered under the
latter approach.27 The problem with determining coverage based on the
policyholder’s actions is that most actions have some intentional
component to them. These cases, therefore, tend to hyper-examine the
conduct leading up to a loss to determine what intentional actions
comprised the behavior. Proving intent is also fraught with difficulty
because coverage often turns on circumstantial evidence or the credibility
of the policyholder’s testimony. This makes determining which of the
he did not subjectively intend damage to the entire residential structure); Clayburn
v Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 871 N.Y.S.2d 487, 488–89 (N.Y. App. Div.
2009) (finding that a policyholder who put victim in bear hug and fell through
plate glass window was still covered because injuries were not subjectively
intended); Allstate Ins. Co. v Sanders, 495 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1109 (D. Nev. 2007)
(finding that intentional act fortuity clause did not bar coverage despite
policyholder throwing a metal sign at someone during horseplay because
policyholder did not subjectively intend to hit or injure victim).
25
See, e.g., Fontenot v. Duplechine, 2004-424, pp. 6–7 (La. App. 3 Cir.
12/8/04); 891 So. 2d 41, 46–47 (finding no coverage when student struck
classmate on the head with desktop, regardless of student’s intent to injure); Metro.
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Buckner, 302 S.W.3d 288, 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009)
(finding no coverage where teens fired rifles at tractor-trailers on interstate, killing
and injuring people, even though their intent was to damage trucks; their intent to
discharge rifles was not enough to oust coverage).
26
See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Weaver, 585 F. Supp. 2d 722, 729
(D.S.C. 2008) (explaining that both the act that caused the loss and the results
thereof must be intentional); Lincoln Logan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fornshell, 722 N.E.2d
239, 242–43 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (explaining that both the act and the harm must be
intended).
27
See, e.g., Vermont Mut. Ins. Co. v. Singleton, 446 S.E.2d 417, 421 (S.C.
1994) (finding coverage where a teen, acting in self-defense, struck another teen
but did not intend to cause extensive eye injuries); Miller v. Fidelity-Phoenix Ins.
Co., 231 S.E.2d 701, 75 (S.C. 1977) (coverage for ten-year-old boy who set fire to
fire trucks was granted because he did not intend for the fire to burn down a home).
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policyholder’s actions trigger a fortuity clause a question with an answer
that is somewhat of a moving target.
b.

Criminal Act Fortuity Clause

Courts attempting to apply the criminal act fortuity clause to make
coverage determinations have devised two different ways of interpreting
this clause, with correspondingly different coverage results. Some courts
have held that any policyholder’s criminal act causally related to the loss
ousts liability insurance coverage, regardless of the policyholder’s intent to
cause the loss.28 Still others have held that a policyholder committing a
crime at the time of the loss will lose liability coverage, regardless as to
whether the crime itself is causally involved in bringing about the loss29 or
whether there was even a criminal charge or conviction.30 Other courts
have held that, in order to oust coverage, a policyholder must have intended
the loss brought about by the criminal act.31 This subjective approach best
matches the criminal act fortuity clause’s purpose as a clause targeted at
removing coverage for non-fortuitous behavior. Otherwise, the clause risks
being used as an unpredictable morality clause, as described more fully
below.

28

See, e.g., Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. McDonough, 608 F.3d 388, 391–92 (8th
Cir. 2010) (explaining that the criminal act fortuity clause does not require
subjective intent to commit the crime); SECURA Supreme Ins. Co. v. M.S.M., 755
N.W.2d 320, 325 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that no subjective intent is
required to trigger criminal act fortuity clause where mentally ill boy stabbed his
neighbor with a knife).
29
See, e.g., Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. K.S., 731 F. Supp. 2d 829, 836 (S.D.
Ind. 2010) (denying coverage where a boy “mooned” an oncoming vehicle,
distracting the driver and causing her to flip the car, as “mooning” is considered a
crime).
30
See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Berube, 854 A.2d 53, 56 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004)
(explaining that a policyholder who got into bed with a rifle and accidentally shot
his wife could theoretically be charged with a crime because he risked injury of
shooting the child who was also in bed with him).
31
See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Raynor, 21 P.3d 707, 712 (Wash. 2001)
(explaining that the criminal act fortuity clause does not apply to all acts
technically classified as crimes but only to serious criminal conduct done with
malicious intent).
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Insurance Policy Interpretation Differences

State-by-state and even court-by-court differences in the basic
insurance policy doctrinal tools employed to interpret fortuity clauses result
in additional inconsistency in interpreting even identically-worded fortuity
clauses.
As insurance policies are contracts of adhesion, special
policyholder-friendly rules have developed over time to assist in fairly
applying meaning to insurance policy language.32 Many states employ a
varied panoply of interpretive tools to help discern the meaning of
insurance policy language. Some states utilize the reasonable expectations
doctrine to varying degrees.33 That doctrine holds that the reasonable
expectations of the policyholder have some interpretive value in discerning
the meaning of insurance policy language. Other states are far stricter
constructionists of insurance policy language, and reasonable expectations
do not come into play in their analyses. Some states also more regularly
employ the doctrine of contra proferentem to construe ambiguous wording
against the insurer drafter.
In some instances, state statutes34 or state public policy35 hold that
liability insurance policies do not cover losses arising from a policyholders’
32

For a discussion of how special policyholder-friendly rules have developed
over time, see, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy
Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531 (1996); Michelle E. Boardman, Contra
Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105
(2006); James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules
of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995 (1992); Robert E.
Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 961 (1970); Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Interpretations of Insurance
Contract Disputes: Toward a Realistic Middle Ground Approach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J.
543 (1996); Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting
Off the Formal for the Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037 (1991).
33
See generally, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and JudgeMade Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L.
REV. 1151 (1981); Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the
Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 295 (1998); Swisher,
Judicial Interpretations, supra note 32; Swisher, Judicial Rationales, supra note
32.
34
See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 2013) (“An insurer is not liable for a
loss caused by the wilful act of the insured; but he is not exonerated by the
negligence of the insured, or of the insured's agents or others”).
35
See, e.g., Swan Consultants, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co., 360 F. Supp.
2d 582, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that New York public policy prohibits
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own willful acts, even if there is no express fortuity clause in the policy
itself. When courts construe fortuity clauses, these additional principles
can confusingly overlap with the insurance policy interpretation exercise.
These differences in interpretive approaches have a costly litigation
spillover effect because litigants often cannot predict how their own courts
would interpret a clause. Indeed, while some courts take a literalist view
about the applicability of the intentional and criminal act fortuity clauses,
others are far more contextual and hold that these clauses may mean
different things depending on the context and policyholder behavior being
examined.
2. Litigation Distortions
There are obvious consistency problems with courts using three
interpretive perspectives and two substantive requirements to interpret the
intentional act fortuity clause and, at the same time, using four interpretive
perspectives to interpret the criminal act fortuity clause. These problems
are compounded by the workarounds invented by litigation counsel
intended to circumvent some of the challenges with these fortuity clauses.
The litigation workarounds produce further costly and unpredictable
litigation distortions.
First, the practice of over or under-pleading a policyholder’s
conduct to attract or repel coverage at the pleadings stage of an action
insurance indemnification for intentionally-caused injuries); Capitol Indem. Corp.
v. Evolution, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1075 (D.N.D. 2003) (explaining that all
insurance policy provisions that allow coverage for intentionally caused injuries
are void by public policy); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Montagna, 874 A.2d
406, 408–09 (Me. 2005) (explaining that policies will not be interpreted to require
an insurer to defend or indemnify an insured for the insured’s own criminal acts);
Farmland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scruggs, 886 So.2d 714, 720 (Miss. 2004); Merrimack
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Coppola, 690 A.2d 1059, 1065 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1997) (explaining that the reasonable insurance contract between the parties
excludes all intentional acts); Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 665 N.E.2d 1115,
1120 (Ohio 1996); Minn. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A.2d 854, 866 (Pa.
2004) (explaining that public policy supports providing coverage for acts that were
not intentional); American Family Mut. Ins. Grp. v. Kostaneski, 688 N.W.2d 410,
415 (S.D. 2004) (explaining that South Dakota public policy precludes extending
coverage to an individual who intentionally harms others.); Decorative Ctr. of
Houston v. Emp’rs Cas. Co., 833 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992)
(explaining that an insured cannot insure against his own intentional misconduct).

2014

FORTUITY VICTIMS

225

actually twists the litigation story in inefficient ways.36 Policyholders are
incentivized to under-plead their case as one involving negligent, not
intentional or criminal, conduct in order to ensure that there will be liability
insurance coverage for the loss. At the same time, insurers are incentivized
to over-plead that the policyholder’s behavior is particularly intentional or
criminal, and anti-social and dangerous, in an attempt to avoid covering a
particular loss. In doing so, litigation counsel may strain and stretch the
facts to a near-unsupportable point in order to craft the litigation story away
from or towards intentional or criminal conduct.
This leads to
inefficiencies in the fact-finding discovery process as parties spend
expensive time attempting to mold the nature of the policyholder’s conduct
not because they actually want the truth but because they want it to either
be, or not be, a certain category of behavior important only for insurance
coverage purposes.
Second, creative lawyers for injured accident victims have
attempted to get around the operation of a fortuity clause by focusing
instead on viable alternative litigation targets through doctrinal innovations
such as vicarious liability or claims for negligent supervision.37 If a
policyholder’s intentional or criminal behavior may trigger a fortuity clause
and thereby leave an accident victim without compensation, the victim’s
lawyer could instead target another category of policyholder who may have
some secondary responsibility for the victim’s injury and who may be
covered by liability insurance. A common example is the use of vicarious
liability to access insurance coverage from another policyholder’s liability
policy. Often, these are institutional policyholders with supervisory
responsibilities over the policyholder who more directly caused the victim
harm. For example, a victim of a sexual assault would typically sue the
perpetrator but, to seek liability insurance coverage, may also sue the
perpetrator’s employer in negligence for failing to supervise the

36

Tom Baker, Liability Insurance at the Tort-Crime Boundary, in FAULT
LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL PRACTICE 66, 69 (David M. Engel & Michael
McCann eds., 2009); Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: Intentional Harms and
the Quest for Insurance Funding, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1721, 1723 (1997); Rick
Swedloff, Uncompensated Torts, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 721, 742–44 (2012);
Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 123–29
(2001).
37
Swedloff, supra note 36, at 742; Wriggins, supra note 36, at 164.
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employee.38 Also, parents and supervisory adults can be sued for
negligently supervising children in their care when children injure others
through intentional or criminal conduct.
When third parties like
supervisory or vicariously liable institutions or parents are injected into the
litigation fray for coverage-seeking purposes only, this can often add
unnecessary delay, complication, and expense to a lawsuit. However,
accident victims are often forced to bring in these additional parties to
ensure access to at least some compensation through liability insurance.
Third, fortuity clauses affect settlement dynamics in significant
ways. In order to preserve insurance coverage, both policyholders and
accident victims have greater incentives to settle a case rather than litigate.
For example, an accident victim may be involved in litigation exhibiting
multiple causes of action. Such a victim may be incentivized to avoid a
judgment on the merits regarding any policyholder intentional or criminal
conduct that might thereby trigger a fortuity clause and thus exclude
liability insurance coverage. A policyholder is incentivized to settle to
preserve personal assets (although the control of the litigation is often
through the insurer’s appointed counsel, the policyholder is obliged to cooperate in the litigation). The policyholder would want to neither admit nor
deny liability regarding an intentional or criminal act in order to maintain
coverage.
Finally, fortuity clause interpretation can fall into common
doctrinal pitfalls about insurance causation, creating further
unpredictability as courts and litigants take different interpretive positions
about the same fortuity clauses. To trigger a fortuity clause, the
policyholder’s behavior should be causative of the loss. The “expected or
intended” intentional act fortuity clause specifically assumes this in its
wording. Other intentional act fortuity clauses oust coverage for loss or
damage “resulting from,” “arising out of,” or “caused by” an intentional act
of the policyholder. Criminal act fortuity clauses also use that similar
linguistic construction where coverage is ousted if the loss or damage is
“resulting from,” “arising out of,” or “caused by” a criminal act of the
policyholder.
If the loss is caused by some other behavior but the policyholder’s
intentional or criminal actions occurs somewhere in the factual matrix,
coverage should not be removed. Insurance causation issues in liability
38

See, e.g., Jeffrey P. Klenk, Emerging Coverage Issues in Employment
Practices Liability Insurance: The Industry Perspective on Recent Developments,
21 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 323, 323–27 (1999).

2014

FORTUITY VICTIMS

227

insurance can get misleadingly confused with tort principles of causation.39
This can prompt courts to produce inconsistent coverage decisions about
fortuity clauses. The question should not be “the policyholder acted
intentionally or criminally and the loss occurred.” The question should
instead be “was the policyholder’s intentional or criminal action one that
brought about the loss.” However, it is very tempting for courts and
litigants to wade into concepts of causal fault and blameworthiness,
particularly because the conduct being considered is intentional or criminal
and courts are used to sorting those questions using fault-based and crimebased language. Insurer litigants may be incentivized to bend insurance
causation principles with criminal and fault-based causation concepts to get
a coverage denial. This merely detracts from the very specific insurance
policy interpretation issue about whether the fortuity clause applies or not,
given the role of certain behavior in bringing about a certain loss.
Differing interpretive approaches and litigation distortions are the
two major sources of unpredictability leading to the problematic nature of
these fortuity clauses. While the interpretive unpredictability is inherent in
the design and wording of the clause itself and the applicable legal rules
around interpreting policy language, the litigation distortions have
expanded in nature over time. Greater certainty in dealing with fortuity
clauses would go a long way to saving money for insurers setting insurance
premiums and funding coverage litigation.
It would also save
policyholders money as there would be less coverage litigation about the
ambiguous nature of fortuity clauses. The by-product of this is that
accident victims’ compensatory needs hang in the balance. They may have
to wait until the coverage questions are sorted out. They may also, often
unpredictably, lose out on compensation one might expect would be a
sensible commercial result if a particular loss triggers a particular liability
insurance policy.
B.

THE COMPENSATORY GAP

Victims of intentional act torts and crimes, or “fortuity victims,”
are often seriously injured and have dire compensatory needs.40 These are
the victims of assaults, attempted murders, and sexual assaults. The
compensatory gap left by the varying and unpredictable approaches to
39

Knutsen, supra note 4, at 968–70.
Swedloff, supra note 36, at 739, 741–44 (detailing the compelling need for
compensation for this particular subset of accident victims).
40
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fortuity clauses expands and contracts because of the unpredictability
involved in interpreting the clauses. Streamline the interpretive process
and one could better control which types of victims would be facing a
compensatory gap, all with an eye to designing a system to sensibly address
such gaps.41 As a result, much fortuity clause insurance coverage litigation
would also drop away. Many fortuity victims find themselves in that
compensation gap because they were unlucky enough to be injured by a
policyholder whose coverage was later denied by an insurer or court
interpreting a fortuity clause in one way or another. The problem is that
other victims in similar circumstances may not meet the same fate,
depending on a given insurer or court’s approach to interpreting the fortuity
clause at issue. This is a very costly and profound problem because it is
difficult to recognize and define solutions for a constantly fluctuating group
of people with real compensatory needs in society. It is also difficult for
insurers trying to set risk-based premiums for risk pools when the potential
payout mutates. It is difficult for policyholders trying to evaluate liability
insurance coverage purchases. A good start to addressing these problems
caused by this mutating compensatory gap is to ensure that fortuity clauses
are interpreted in predictable fashions so that one can discern who is in the
gap and how big it really is.
If liability insurance proceeds are denied fortuity victims as a result
of the operation of a fortuity clause, where do those injury costs go? There
are few other avenues of recourse left. The policyholder is likely unable to
provide compensatory assistance in a personal fashion.42 Very few people
carry first party disability insurance.43 Most may carry health insurance for
the out-of-pocket expenses from physical injuries. There may be recourse
for the fortuity victim through government-run victims’ compensation
funds, but these are often limited in nature.44 Most fortuity victims,

41

Swedloff, supra note 36, at 724–27 (generating solutions for serious gaps in
intentional tort victims’ ability to recover damages in the face of fortuity clauses);
Wriggins, supra note 36, at 152–57 (exploring solutions for victims of domestic
violence torts who are presently not compensated because of the operation of
fortuity clauses in their attackers’ liability insurance policies).
42
Stephen Giles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603,
606 (2006) (detailing how most tortfeasors in lawsuits would be unable to satisfy a
tort judgment from their personal assets).
43
See, e.g., Jerry & Richmond, supra note 22, at 482–83.
44
Swedloff, supra note 36, at 726 (noting the limited nature of governmentrun criminal injuries compensation schemes).
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however, are left to “lump it.”45 That means that the social cost of
absorbing their injury-related expenses is off-loaded from the at-fault
tortfeasor to employer workplace accommodations and to primarily statefunded programs for the needy: Medicare, Medicaid, welfare, and other
state disability programs.46 The fact remains that the current web of modern
accident compensation relies heavily on privately available liability
insurance. There are just not sufficient mechanisms to provide effective
compensation for fortuity victims who unpredictably fall through the cracks
solely because they cannot access a policyholder’s liability insurance due
to some conduct on the part of the policyholder, which itself is fortuitous
when viewed from some interpretive perspectives. So, having a smaller
and more predictably identifiable group of uncompensated fortuity victims
would take the burden off of the other, inadequate socialized compensation
mechanisms. This would shift some of the burden to insurers who may
have taken a premium for underwriting a risk that will never materialize
simply because of a fluxious interpretation of a fortuity clause in the wake
of actual fortuitous behavior on the part of the policyholder. What it would
leave would be those whose losses are the result of truly non-fortuitous
circumstances, which best suits the true purpose of liability insurance in the
first place.
VI.

THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEMS

The reason that there are palpable and systemic inconsistencies
with how these fortuity clauses are applied in a liability insurance context
stems from two linked, dynamic notions: the tensions between the two
purposes of liability insurance (wealth protection and victim compensation)
coupled with a move from explanatory rhetoric about fortuity to
explanatory rhetoric about morality.

45

See, e.g., Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims and
Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 547 (1981)
(describing the strategy of not pursuing a claim and writing it off to “experience”).
46
Pryor, supra note 19, at 309–10 (demonstrating how the cost of tort law’s
occasional failure to compensate accident victims is borne elsewhere in society, in
an inefficient manner).
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THE TENSION BETWEEN WEALTH PROTECTION AND ACCIDENT
COMPENSATION

The tension between two perceived purposes for liability insurance
is at the root of the uncertainty in interpreting fortuity clauses. Solving this
tension – or at least recognizing it and balancing it appropriately in context
– would go a long way toward streamlining the interpretive process,
keeping litigation costs down, and reducing the mutating compensation
gap.
Liability insurance is different than other types of insurance in that
it is third party insurance. That difference is at the heart of the tension
between the two purposes for this kind of insurance. Unlike property, life,
and long-term disability insurance (all of which are first party insurance
products), the proceeds of any triggered liability insurance go to pay some
injured third party for a loss resulting from the policyholder’s behavior.
Private market liability insurance comprises the largest and most prevalent
compensatory source for injured accident victims.47 Liability insurance is
the backbone of the tort system. Tort suits would not be brought if not for
available liability insurance.48 Society has organized itself around there
being a private insurance safety blanket for much of today’s risky conduct,
from driving to owning a business or a home.49 So liability insurance serves
an important and expected societal accident compensation goal.
However, these are not the reasons why liability insurance is
designed and marketed by insurers, or purchased by policyholders.
Liability insurance is bought and sold as a risk transfer product to protect
the assets of a policyholder in the event that policyholder becomes legally
liable to pay for another’s loss. This wealth protection purpose is very
different from the broader compensatory purpose that liability insurance
serves in society. Insurance as wealth protection focuses on the concerns
of the policyholder who purchased the insurance product. Insurance as
47

See Baker, supra note 5, at 4–6 (arguing that liability insurance has become
“a de facto element of tort liability”).
48
Id. at 4; Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of
Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 275 (2001) (detailing how tort
suits are typically not brought unless there are valid, collectible insurance proceeds
available); Adam F. Scales, Following Form: Corporate Succession and Liability
Insurance, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 573, 614 (2011) (noting that tort and insurance
exist in “complementarity”).
49
Wriggins, supra note 36, at 150 (noting the prevalence of insurance in
society).
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accident compensation focuses on the concerns of the injured accident
victim in society (or, more broadly, on the concerns of society for
compensating accident victims). One can be fairly certain that most
policyholders do not purchase liability insurance out of altruistic concern
for the well-being of some future accident victim who is a complete
stranger. At most, that effect is a secondary offshoot of the insurance
purchase. Yet, of course, most policyholders would wish and expect that
anyone or any entity who injures them would carry sufficient liability
insurance so that appropriate compensation would be forthcoming to that
policyholder victim. The accident compensation purpose of liability
insurance thus raises an interesting collective action concern. The accident
compensation purpose is the reason why injured accident victims hope
others have purchased liability insurance yet the wealth protection purpose
is the reason why the policyholder actually purchases the insurance. The
focus changes from victim to policyholder as one examines these two
purposes of liability insurance.
Liability insurance is therefore a very strange market product: it is
something we think we buy to help us protect our wealth but it additionally
helps someone else as well. This is all the more strange when one adds the
fact that most policyholders would not be able to pay for a tort judgment
out of their own personal assets in any event.50 The result of a tort suit
against most uninsured people would be either no tort suit at all or
bankruptcy. So there is, quite literally, often little to no wealth to protect.
Yet, at the same time, those with modest assets to protect may actually
value the wealth protection aspect of insurance even more than a wealthy
policyholder, simply because the loss of their modest assets would mean
financial destitution. Policyholders’ subjective value of the wealth
protection aspect of insurance therefore is mediated by the value placed on
that policyholder’s wealth.
However, this tension between the two purposes of liability
insurance informs much of the interpretive process when courts are faced
with having to interpret fortuity clauses. In that context, can these two
purposes of liability insurance co-exist, or are they mutually exclusive? As
will be shown, both purposes need to be balanced against each other, but in
the liability insurance context, the actual effect of the wealth protection
purpose on those with modest assets to protect can be less significant in
most instances whereas the effect of the accident compensation purpose on
a severely injured victim is certainly tangible, but is left to hang in the
50

See, e.g., Giles, supra note 42, at 606; Baker, supra note 5, at 7.

232

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 21.1

balance. Surprisingly, this is often forgotten in the shift from fortuity to
morality clause as will next be described. The wealth protection purpose
controls the rhetoric at the expense of the accident victim’s – and
ultimately society’s – compensatory needs.
B.

FROM FORTUITY CLAUSE TO MORALITY CLAUSE

Having dynamic tension between the two purposes of liability
insurance creates opportunities for using different explanatory rhetoric
about what fortuity clauses are supposed to be doing. This creates much of
the unprincipled inefficiencies and unfairness as noted above in the
previous Part. Quite simply, courts can get mired in misleading rhetoric.
Litigants in an insurance dispute (especially insurers) are incentivized to
use this competing rhetoric to their advantage. The rhetoric goes
something like this: do fortuity clauses ensure that insurers only indemnify
for fortuitous losses? Or instead do fortuity clauses provide a mechanism
for punishment and deterrence by ensuring that wrongdoing policyholders
are deprived of the wealth protection benefit of liability insurance? The
answer depends on how one views what liability insurance is supposed to
be doing: protecting a policyholder’s wealth or acting as a source of
compensation for an injured accident victim.
1. The Move from Morality to Fortuity
To explain how a fortuity clause can be rhetorically mutated into a
“morality” clause,51 one needs to understand the origins of the choice of
language for fortuity clauses in liability insurance. Historically, insurance
has had a societal challenge: it has had to separate itself from gambling,
once seen as an immoral act.52 It is not difficult to understand, even with
today’s sensibilities, that profiting by guessing on whether or not some
terrible disaster will befall a policyholder can be an activity tinged with
moral undertones. One only has to think about life insurance, a product
that essentially hedges a bet on when the policyholder will die, to see the
moral implications and concerns – all the more so if a policyholder or some
wrongdoer attempts to tip the scales of chance by controlling the risk of an
outcome actually occurring.
51

Knutsen, supra note 8, at 103–11 (fortuity clauses shift to morality clauses).
Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 24449 (1996) (describing the genesis of the insurance concept of moral hazard).
52
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The term “moral hazard” as understood today in insurance law is
used to describe the situation whereby the presence of insurance reduces
incentives to minimize losses because the losses will be insured.53 But
originally, in the nineteenth century, “moral hazard” was about a financial
concern to insurers that was simultaneously a full-fledged moral concern to
a society not used to the concept of insurance. The “moral” hazard was
about altering the odds of the insurance arrangement so as to make a
chance loss a certain loss.54 Purchasing fire property insurance and then
burning down one’s own house to get the insurance proceeds is the classic
example.
At the time, the insurance market consisted largely of maritime,
fire and property insurance, not liability insurance.55 Insurance was bought
and sold purely as a wealth protection product. There was no need to
consider victim compensation because there was no market for liability
insurance. There did not yet exist the societal web of compensatory
structures designed to address accident victims’ needs. Insurance was not
expected to provide injury compensation.
Specific to concerns about insurance and morality was the
longstanding legal notion that a criminal should not be able to profit from
his crime.56 This “public policy” rule holds, for example, that a murderer
should not be able to obtain the proceeds of life insurance from the
policyholder he murdered if he was also the beneficiary of the policy.
Behavior such as willful arson to one’s own home to cash in on insurance
proceeds would be deemed “immoral” by society, illegal by the courts, as
well as unprofitable to insurers. Policyholders tinkering with those odds
were a particularly “moral” hazard for (mostly fire) insurers of the
nineteenth century because those insurers were struggling with a public
relations image problem set squarely in morality concerns. By removing
the “moral” hazards from insurance, insurers could create a more profitable
enterprise and, at the same time, a more socially palatable form of
institutional risk transfer.
53

Id. at 242.
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT
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To an insurer concerned about insuring only risky, not certain,
losses, it was important to remove coverage for losses intentionally and
thus certainly brought about by a policyholder’s conduct. This, in turn,
would solve not only the very practical commercial efficacy concerns of
the insurer, but also the concerns about insurance violating the public
policy rule and the concerns about insurance incentivizing loss-causing
behavior. In law, there are two categories of behavior that involve
policyholders’ intentional conduct: intentional torts and criminal behavior.
To remove the incentive for policyholders to bring about certain losses, any
insurance policy would therefore have to target that kind of intentional or
criminal behavior, which would either violate the public policy rule or
result in policyholders obtaining coverage for losses they intentionally
caused. The intentional act fortuity clause was written to remove insurance
coverage for intentional torts. A criminal acts fortuity clause would ensure
that certain losses arising from criminal conduct would also be removed
from coverage.
Excluding from insurance coverage losses arising from a
policyholder’s criminal conduct had a three-fold effect. First, criminal law
by nature typically assumes an element of intent or mens rea: one has to
intend to do the crime in order to be convicted.57 At the time of the clause’s
genesis, the criminal law was far less complex and nuanced than it is today,
with fewer regulatory offences or fluctuating states of intent that could be
considered criminal. This original batch of largely specific intent-based
crimes served up a ready-made category of intentional conduct which is
precisely the type of conduct targeted by the very moral hazard concerns of
insurers of the day. Second, the clause contractually enshrined the public
policy rule that criminals could not profit from their crimes through
insurance proceeds. Finally, removing from coverage losses brought about
by criminal behavior served the additional purpose of again separating the
insurance business from the moral concerns about policyholders seeking to
profit from their crimes. The criminal act fortuity clause appeared to target
wrongful behavior that people naturally do not like. If crime made up a
category of behavior which society did not condone, and if crime happened
to be the same type of behavior that was also non-fortuitous and thus
uninsurable, this appeared to be the perfect exclusion. The clause thus
deters criminals and those intent on causing harm from using insurance to
reap ill-gotten gains. It also punishes those same bad actors because their
57
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insurance coverage –t he very benefit for which they paid – is removed
based on their conduct. To the insurance-shy audience of the time, this
second message undoubtedly played better than the first. They could rest
assured that insurance was not incentivizing crime.
The intentional act and criminal act fortuity clauses then found
their way into a burgeoning liability insurance market many years later.
The early years of the liability insurance market existed without the societal
expectation that liability insurance would be the backbone of the accident
compensation system.58 People whose injuries were not compensated by
liability insurance proceeds were largely expected to “lump it.” Liability
insurance was marketed and constructed much as property insurance: as a
wealth protection mechanism for a policyholder concerned about having to
pay for potential legal liability (and, as a byproduct, was a source of
compensation for the accident victim). Because liability insurance
provides coverage for a policyholder’s legal liability, it stands to reason
that, if the legal liability was brought about by a loss a policyholder
intentionally caused, the policyholder’s conduct resulting in the intentional
loss is a moral hazard and should be excluded from coverage. The
intentional act fortuity clause therefore performs that same moral hazard
gatekeeping function it would in a property policy. The same could be said
for the effect of the criminal act fortuity clause in liability insurance
policies except it additionally maintained the function of underscoring that
criminals could not enjoy wealth protection from legal liability arising from
crimes they committed. The crimes targeted were those specific intent
crimes of the day like murder and arson. Criminal law was, as has been
mentioned, far simpler than the laundry list of crimes comprising most
penal codes today.
Another way to separate the insurance business from the moral
undertones of gambling on the happenstance (or not) of another’s disaster,
and the fear that some would consciously influence events in order to bring
about an insured loss, was to shift the language of discourse about
insurance from morality to fortuity. Concepts of risk can then be discussed
in essentially amoral terms. At some point in time, the insurance industry
shifted its public identity from being a business concerned about separating
itself from immoral gambling to being a business offering wealth
protection through risk exchange.59 Perhaps this occurred over time as
insurance proliferated and people became used to seeing insurance operate
58
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without many nefarious moral hazard concerns being realized. Perhaps
instead it was a concerted industry effort to further separate insurance from
morality and thus sanitize the business of insurance as it entered into
regular commerce. Regardless, insurance became less about moral public
image and more about risk and fortuity. Liability insurance proliferated
and became the backbone of the accident compensation system. The
criminal law became far more complex beyond mere specific intent crimes.
The concept of moral hazard shed its “moral” roots and became aimed
instead at an insurer’s concern for incentivizing overly risky behavior due
to the presence of available insurance. Yet, the intentional act and criminal
act fortuity clauses originally aimed at not only insurer profitability and
fortuity concerns, but morality concerns as well, remained in liability
insurance policies. The attempt to get morality out of insurance was
largely successful, except for the potential throwback effect of these
fortuity clauses.
However, a partially successful fortuity story could be told using
these clauses, giving them the appearance that they still operated as
intended in the new world of fortuity. It is true that intentionally caused
losses are borne of the very fortuity-frustrating behavior that wreaks havoc
with the insurance arrangement. But unless what is excluded from
coverage is actually only behavior that turns a fortuitous event into a
certain event, the fortuity clause is doing something else. Herein lies the
problem, and the source of the inconsistency in the court decisions
construing fortuity clauses in insurance coverage disputes. The only
behavior in a liability insurance context that takes a fortuitous event and
makes it a certain event is that behavior in which the policyholder engages
with the specific and subjective intent to bring about the realized loss. If
the policyholder did not intend the specific type of loss, the loss is still
fortuitous to the policyholder. Therefore, removing liability insurance
coverage for behavior that results in an unintended loss does not influence
the policyholder’s behavior and is done at the expense of the accident
victim awaiting compensation. The moral hazard problem, in fortuity
terms, is not affected.
2. The Move from Fortuity Back to Morality
However, the moral trappings of the intentional act and criminal
act fortuity clauses remain. In fact, liability insurers are incentivized to
hearken back to the moral bases of these clauses because they are
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compelling (if misleading) platforms for arguing for policyholders’
coverage denial.60 In this regard, the fortuity clauses can frequently
transform into morality clauses in an insurance coverage dispute.61 The
conversation shifts from one about fortuity and risk transfer concepts to one
about morality involving how denying insurance coverage produces
desirable social effects of punishment and deterrence. At the same time,
and via the same dynamic, the notion of liability insurance as accident
victim compensation source is eclipsed by a return to an exclusive notion
of liability insurance as wealth protection for the policyholder. These two
planes of discourse converge to warp judicial analysis about insurance
coverage and produce inconsistent and troubling results because no
purposes of insurance are actually fulfilled in the end result: not victim
compensation or wealth protection nor fortuity or punishment concerns.
The rhetoric just does not work.
For example, a policyholder is showing to his friend a firearm he
believes is unloaded. The policyholder slips and the gun accidentally
discharges and injures the friend.62 The policyholder did not intend to harm
the victim but nonetheless is charged with criminal negligence causing
bodily harm. The criminal act fortuity clause ousts coverage for legal
liability for a loss resulting from a “criminal act” of the policyholder. On
its face, this has been categorized as a criminal event – the policyholder
was charged with a crime. However, he did not intend to commit the
crime. He did not intend to harm the friend. The main element of criminal
negligence is the negligence standard – the marked departure from
reasonable conduct in society. There is no specific intent required to prove
this crime. It is a “negligence-based” crime targeting risky conduct.
How, then, does an insurer argue that the legal liability resulting
from this loss is excluded by the criminal act fortuity clause? More
60

See, e.g., JAY FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE
COMPANIES DON’T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT (2010)
(canvassing the variety of tactics insurers are incentivized to undertake in denying
claims); Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories,
Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1410–11
(1993) (exploring the way in which insurers weave the narrative in claims denials);
Baker, supra note 36 (describing how moral considerations affect interpretation of
the criminal act fortuity clause);.
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Knutsen, supra note 8, at 103.
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specifically, based on the wording of that clause, how can an insurer
articulate the reasoning behind why a policyholder’s loss should not be
covered? This is an important point, because the result may be a denial of
vital compensation to the injured friend. An insurer could of course argue
that the policyholder committed a criminal act and this policy ousts
coverage for criminal acts, so there is no coverage, regardless as to the
nature of the crime. That is a literalist argument and it meets some success
in some courts.63 However, again, the result is dire: the injured victim is left
with nothing and the wealth protection aspect of insurance is not realized
for the policyholder. Many courts (though not all), operating in a procoverage insurance law environment, are compelled to look further to
satisfy themselves that this is indeed the result intended by this clause and
this insurance policy.64
A fortuity-based argument falls short. The loss was fortuitous to
the policyholder. The policyholder did not intend for the firearm to
discharge. He did not intend the specific harm to his friend. Indeed, he did
not intend any harm to occur at all. He thought the gun was unloaded. So
it is not possible to argue that the criminal act fortuity clause here is
designed to circumvent fortuity-frustrating behavior by removing from
coverage those losses that are certain. The loss was fortuitous. The
policyholder could not have adjusted his gun-showing behavior to have ex
ante avoided it. Furthermore, liability insurance is broad-spectrum tort or
behavior insurance, and perhaps this is just the sort of fortuitous behavior
63

See, e.g., Wilderman v. Powers, 956 A.2d 613 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008)
(denying coverage for liability for neighbor’s alleged psychological injuries when
insured peeping tom photographed naked neighbor and was sued because his
conduct was criminal in nature); Auto Club Grp. Ins. Co. v. Booth, 797 N.W.2d
695 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (denying coverage for accidental shooting when drunk
held gun against tenant’s wrist, even though he did not intend the gun to
discharge); SECURA Supreme Ins. Co. v. M.S.M, 755 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2008) (holding that youth’s attack of neighbor was a “criminal act,”
regardless of intent of youth to harm neighbor); Gruninger v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 905 N.Y.S. 2d 391 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (denying coverage when insured
accidentally shot other hunter); Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. McDonough, 608 F.3d
388 (8th Cir. 2010) (interpreting plain language of criminal act exclusion as having
no intent requirement so insured’s intent irrelevant at time of accident).
64
See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Zuk, 574 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y. 1991) (discussing
whether accidental shooting while cleaning gun was an accident that could
“reasonably be expected to result” from a “criminal act,” despite insured’s guilty
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the policy is expected to cover. So, under fortuity reasoning, this is the
type of loss that liability insurance should cover – behavior courting some
risk of loss.
An insurer who then cannot make a compelling argument on
fortuity grounds for ousting coverage via the criminal act fortuity clause
often is then incentivized to return to the original moral basis for the clause.
In doing so, insurers move from contract law principles to tort to criminal
law, all in the context of an insurance policy interpretation issue that is
typically and rightfully dealt with on contract-based insurance law
principles alone. Shifting legal spheres allows the insurer greater leeway to
argue for the applicability of the fortuity clause while all the time moving
up the moral ladder in persuasiveness. Additionally, insurers shift the
focus of discussion from the injured accident victim to the wrongdoer
policyholder to those also in the insurance risk pool to society as a whole.
Coverage should be denied the policyholder here, the moral
argument goes, because we want to hold the wrongdoer accountable for his
actions. By denying the policyholder the wealth protection aspect of the
insurance, the policyholder will have to pay for the loss himself, unaided
by insurance. This is a return to classic corrective justice reasoning from
tort law involving redress between wrongdoer and victim,65 except the
victim here appears to be the insurer and not the accident victim. As has
been mentioned, there is little possibility that the policyholder ever benefits
in today’s standard tort litigation settings because most do not have
sufficient personal wealth to satisfy a tort judgment against them.66
Furthermore, an insurer is also incentivized to argue that policyholders who
behave in socially unacceptable ways are not deserving of liability
insurance protection because this type of socially unacceptable conduct is
not the sort that well-intentioned, premium-paying policyholders would
want to support through payment out of their own risk pooled insurance
funds.67 This shifts the focus again from the policyholder to the perceived
desires of other allegedly upstanding policyholders in the risk pool. Other
policyholders would not want to subsidize a loss brought about by a
65
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careless, gun-toting person who had the poor judgment to point the firearm
at his friend. The shift is a decidedly moral one, designed to appeal to a
collective sense of moral conduct judgment on the part of a group not
present in the lawsuit – other policyholders. The sense is that reasonable
policyholders would not behave like that, and therefore would not want
their hard-earned premium dollars to go towards indemnifying for conduct
they would deem unfit to insure. Finally, insurers are incentivized to argue
that coverage should be denied in these instances because we want to deter
this kind of behavior from happening again.68 People should not point guns
at other people. The wrongdoer policyholder needs to be punished in order
to achieve this deterrence goal, so the benefit of liability insurance should
be denied to him. These wrongdoer policyholders are, as Baker dubs them,
the “moral monsters.”69 This shifts the argument to criminal law principles
of punishment and deterrence. The target of the argument is now not the
accident victim, the policyholder or other policyholders but instead society
as a whole. The policyholder needs punishment so that this kind of bad act
does not happen again. The removal of wealth protection via insurance
will accomplish that important societal goal. But can it really?
3. Problems with the Moves
There are many structural problems with this shift from fortuity
clause to morality clause. First, it produces incoherent and inconsistent
judicial decisions because some courts rely on fortuity-based arguments to
determine insurance coverage, while others are swayed by the moral
arguments, and still others a little of both. The reasoning patterns are
different. The underlying assumptions for the reasoning are different. But
the cause of much inconsistency is this very vacillation from fortuity to
morality, from policyholder to insurer to society, and from the purpose of
victim compensation to the purpose of wealth protection. There are just too
many exclusive structural axes to shift and combine in the analysis when
the whole exercise is supposed to be about determining the presence or
absence of liability insurance coverage based on principles of insurance
policy interpretation.
Second, the argument takes the moral origins of the fortuity clause
and reverses them to apparently indicate that insurance can now do
something that it actually is not designed to do at all. At one time, the
68
69
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insurance industry strove to separate its business from anything to do with
morality. That was the industry’s reason to shift to the discourse about
fortuity and risk. That was the reason why the fortuity clauses were
inserted into the early policies. Yet here, in the present, the insurance
industry is incentivized to again return to morality but this time in a
completely different way: insurer as morality crusader. Instead of resiling
from the idea that insurance is a potential mechanism for immorality to
occur, the denial of insurance (now apparently a social good) is presented
as a mechanism to provide socially desirable, moral benefits, like
deterrence and punishment of criminals or bad actors.
Insurance as presently constituted cannot achieve punishment and
deterrence goals for a variety of reasons. Most policyholders are unable to
personally satisfy a tort judgment from their finances, so the ability to mete
out punishment by denying liability insurance coverage would frequently
be impossible.70 Even with a financially capable policyholder, the threat of
losing liability insurance protection pales in comparison to the threats
possible under civil or criminal law for the same conduct.71 For example,
few criminals would say they were deterred from the crime due to fears of
losing liability insurance coverage. If fears of going to jail or of harming
others do not deter the conduct, how can liability coverage concerns do the
same? Finally, few would condone insurers acting as quasi-public
intermediaries for states in doling out some kind of social punishment.72
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Insurance law, based as it is largely on contract law principles, contains
none of the standard liberty-protecting safeguards found in criminal law.
Selling insurance policies to the public does not make insurers some sort of
deputized private attorneys general who provide a contractually premised
social vehicle through which anti-social behavior can be corrected. Despite
all of this, and most importantly, the fact remains that there is a competing
expectation for the insurance proceeds beyond that of the policyholder.
The accident victim’s compensation hangs in the balance of whatever
moral considerations are weighed, making whatever punishment leveled on
a policyholder felt, instead, by the victim herself, for it is the victim who is
the ultimate recipient of the insurance indemnity.
As the example about the policyholder’s accidental firearms
discharge shows, insurers often cannot support both a fortuity-based and a
morality-based argument at the same time because one explanation for
coverage denial cancels out the other. If the morality-based argument is
misleading and inaccurate, as it most assuredly is, then that leaves the
insurer with only fortuity-based arguments to buttress fortuity clause
coverage denials. And that is probably the way it should be. The focus
would remain on simple actuarial risk management principles and not on
slippery moral concerns.
The focus would also remain on the
policyholder’s conduct and whether or not the loss is certain or fortuitous,
as opposed to some perceived social engineering wishes of an insurer, other
policyholders in the risk pool, or society as a whole.
But the shift from fortuity to morality also forces the conversation
away from one about insurance as accident victim compensation source.
There is no morality story to tell there about coverage denial. In fact, the
moral thing to do may well be to ensure that compensation is somehow
available for the victim in some fashion or another, as long as the loss was
realized fortuitously. Turning a fortuity clause into a morality clause,
however, prevents that consideration because the morality story is squarely
focused on the purpose of insurance as a wealth protection mechanism for
policyholders. Keeping the analysis grounded in fortuity discourse is most
compatible with an approach that at least does not lose sight of the fact that
it is the accident victim’s compensation hanging in the balance.
Is it possible to have an insurance story about the applicability of
fortuity clauses where the discourse is grounded in neutral fortuity
concerns, not morality concerns, and that still is compatible with both
more likely to engage in criminal behavior, from drug use to misdemeanors and
beyond).
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notions of insurance as wealth protection and insurance as victim
compensation source? Perhaps. The key would be to ensure that,
whenever concerns about one purpose of liability insurance are driving the
interpretive analysis, those concerns do not unsettlingly trump concerns of
the other purpose. The purposes do not have to compete but can be
complementary. This is only possible by avoiding morality discourse and
keeping the insurance analysis grounded in fortuity discourse.
For example, take the case about the policyholder negligently
injuring his friend with the firearm. Whether or not his liability insurance
coverage should be ousted by his “criminal act” can be assessed using
fortuity discourse. His actions and the loss were entirely fortuitous. What
he did may have been careless, but it did not transform the shooting from
possibility to certainty. To that end, coverage should be maintained,
despite his criminal charge. Fortuity was not frustrated here. This was still
a chance loss. This was, in other words, not a “criminal act” for insurance
purposes resulting in a certain loss, even though the conduct may have
triggered the criminal law for state sanction purposes. By the same token,
depriving the injured accident victim of his compensation also weighs
against denying insurance coverage for anything but a non-fortuitous loss.
So, if the same policyholder intentionally murdered his friend with
the firearm, the situation would be different. Here, his actions purposely
changed the loss from a possibility to a certainty. The policyholder had
complete control as to whether or not that loss would be brought about. He
knew the gun was loaded. Fortuity would be frustrated and the insurance
arrangement breaks down. This is the very risk that the fortuity clause
targets. It is the very thing insurance does not insure. While the injured
accident victim would lose his source of compensation, insurance based on
fortuitous risk transfer is not the vehicle best tuned to provide that
compensation. One must look elsewhere at another compensatory solution
for those injured victims who are harmed by losses that were made certain
to occur at the hands of the policyholder.
VII.

SOLUTIONS: SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETIVE PERSPECTIVE

At present, the most sensible solution to interpreting the
applicability of either the intentional act fortuity clause or the criminal act
fortuity clause is to only deny coverage when fortuity is truly frustrated –
when a loss has been made certain to occur by the purposeful conduct of a
policyholder. Otherwise, the clauses get bogged down in discourse about
morality and about the rightful purpose of liability insurance itself.
Insurance coverage decisions will then be more streamlined. It will be
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clearer to insurers, policyholders and third party accident victims that
private liability insurance is presently designed to “pay the prankster but
not the arsonist, and the risky fool but not the premeditated murderer.”73
Such a practice will go a long way to closing the compensatory gap for
injured accident victims so that the only accident victims left in it are those
who miss out on compensation from a policyholder’s liability insurance
because that policyholder acted to make a loss a certainty. For that smaller
group, another compensation solution needs to be devised, layered on top
of the existing liability insurance scheme.
It makes sense to interpret the criminal act fortuity clause as one
that ousts liability insurance coverage for only specific-intent crimes where
the policyholder had the intent to bring about certain loss. To do otherwise
is to doom the insurance interpretation analysis to a quagmire of morally
muddy analytics. The simple, literal answer to the question “when does the
clause apply?” provides a troubling practical answer if coverage is ousted
for any loss arising from some related criminal act of the policyholder.
Courts have struggled with “what” criminal acts count as “criminal acts.”74
Does a charge for speeding oust liability coverage? What about
negligence-based crimes or regulatory offences? In the face of broad-based
coverage for legal liability, a blanket exclusion for “anything catching the
attention of the criminal law” can leave uninsured a wide variety of losscausing behavior, to the surprise of many policyholders (and probably a
few insurers) ex post. That leaves many accident victims in an
unpredictable situation, with no source of compensation despite suffering a
loss fortuitous to the policyholder. Policyholders cannot adjust their
behavior accordingly, as they are unable to predict what behavior is
covered and what is not.
That interpretive approach, however, does not comport with a
literal reading of the criminal act fortuity clause. Is the criminal act fortuity
clause essentially doing the same job as the intentional act fortuity clause,
rendering it superfluous? One explanation for interpreting the clause in an
expansive fashion is simple rigid contract law: the insurer put those words
73
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in and, as insurance is a contract, the policyholder accepted those
conditions when she purchased the policy and is now bound by them.
Some courts have buttressed coverage denial using this contractual
argument.75 This, however, ignores the fact that there is increasing
evidence that insurance – especially liability insurance – is much more than
a simple contract.76 At the very least, hinging on this contractual decision is
access to compensation for the injured accident victim. There is little room
for such considerations in a literalist contractual interpretation of the
criminal act fortuity clause. That makes it problematic as an analytical
approach. By not at least addressing some potential purpose as to why the
clause is in the policy, the accident victim’s compensation becomes the
automatic sacrifice. In an insurance law environment with pro-coverage
interpretive tools like contra proferentem and reasonable expectations,
many courts struggle against this literalist interpretation (perhaps for good
reason).
One possible explanation for the clause beyond a simplistic “these
are what the words say,” as held by some courts, is that insurers mean to
exclude from coverage any losses arising from criminal conduct because
those losses are a riskier category than some other category of behavior.77
Insurers are free to determine which risks they will underwrite and which
they will not. That is a market-based decision on the part of an insurer.
However, second-guessing what an insurer “wants” to do, without evidence
75
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of an insurer’s drafting and underwriting intent, meets with some
skepticism when the injured accident victim’s compensation is the
collateral at stake in such a “guess.” As has been explained above, today’s
policyholders are often unable to ex ante predict what behavior will lead to
a criminal charge, except for those obvious traditional, specific intent-based
crimes like murder, assault, or arson. So if it is the insurer’s intention to
exclude from coverage any and all losses arising out of a policyholder’s
criminal actions, regardless of the policyholder’s subjective intent to bring
about the loss, that intention, in today’s modern world, has to be based on
something other than a moral concern for crime prevention, which, as
mentioned above, this clause cannot effectively accomplish in any event.
This explanation for the clause’s interpretation also ignores the fact
that the very coverage offered is for legal liability arising from risky
behavior: negligence. There is no evidence that all behavior branded as
“criminal” after the behavior occurs is any more or less costly to insure, as
a category of behavior, than any negligent behavior. It is not the type of
exclusion that deals with an ex ante palpable effect on risk simply because
the behavior is often categorized by the state as “criminal” after it occurs.
This is different than exclusions in a homeowner’s liability policy for
running a commercial business like a hair salon in the home without telling
the insurer, thereby increasing the risk of loss by having more traffic in and
out of the house and operating equipment not normally found in all homes.
This is arguably different than other traditional exclusions for property
insurance coverage like excluding losses arising from pollution or water
damage or earthquake. By contrast, those specific property insurance
losses are the sort that are inherently more financially risky to insure
because the losses, if realized, are more expensive and might have the
potential to affect multiple policyholders at once, across multiple lines of
insurance products.78 Such is not the case with a loss resulting from a
criminal act.
In addition, whether or not a certain type of conduct is criminal or
not has no bearing on whether or not losses are arising in non-fortuitous
ways. Penal statutes are not written with an eye to what behavior actually
realizes a certain loss but rather are conduct based, not results based.
Crime is about something different than the presence or absence of
insurable losses. Insurers have no control over what crimes are included or
78
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not in penal statutes. Furthermore, what is considered “criminal” behavior
is ever-changing over time. At the time an insurer drafts an insurance
policy, behavior not considered criminal may, in the future, be deemed
criminal. A few decades ago, who could have predicted the crimes
associated with the internet and identity theft? Nowadays there are
criminal investigations and prosecutions against teenagers for hacking into
websites for fun or for cyber-bullying a classmate, despite the intent
sometimes being to “tease.”
So if the clause is ineffective at deterring crime and if it is
essentially no riskier to insure losses arising from criminal acts as a distinct
category of ex ante behavior than those arising from negligent acts in terms
of size or frequency of losses, and if, in fact, the very behavior targeted by
the clause is a mutating continuum of behavior as the criminal law changes
over time, then why are insurers not providing coverage for losses arising
from criminal acts? Could it be that, as many courts note, crime is
uninsurable?79
This, too, does not bear out in reality. Only a subsection of crime
is conceptually uninsurable: those losses intentionally brought about by a
criminal policyholder. Other losses arising from criminal behavior are
fortuitous and insurable, as long as the policyholder did not intend to bring
about the loss. In fact, there are many instances in insurance where crimes
of one nature or another are insured and insurers still profit. One example
is property insurance for theft. Another is coverage for a legal defense in a
director’s and officer’s liability policy if the director or officer faces a
criminal charge. Some liability insurance policies insure policyholders
against awards of punitive damages. Still others provide liability coverage
for vicarious liability for an employee’s intentional actions, including
assault and sexual assault. Liability insurers are still able to underwrite
these risks and turn a profit in the insurance business.
The only available rationale for the criminal act fortuity clause is
that it enshrines the public policy notion – still relevant today – that
79

See, e.g., Minn. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A.2d 854, 866 (Pa.
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insurance will not be used by a criminal to profit from his crime.80 It also
assists in an evidentiary fashion by ousting coverage for specific-intent
crimes so that tortious intent need not be proven by the insurer seeking to
remove coverage. The work has already been done in the criminal case.
So the clause acts as a sort of doctrinal shortcut to proving the necessary
intent required in making coverage determinations. As long as the
policyholder is not profiting from a crime, or intentionally causing a loss
that is the result of a crime, the clause’s purpose is upheld.
If the purpose of insurance is seen as a wealth protection product
only, this public policy notion of the clause fits with more modern fortuity
concerns. The only way a policyholder insured by liability insurance could
ever “profit” from his crimes (here, “profit” meaning enjoying the wealth
protection aspect of the insurance) would be if he brought about a certain
loss. So a bar brawler picks a fight and slugs another patron because he
knows that if he injures that patron and is sued, at least his liability insurer
will cover the losses. If, however, the policyholder did not commit a crime
with intent to cause the insured loss, there is no way the policyholder could
“profit.” The act of profiting itself requires some implicit intent that the
policyholder aims to profit from his actions.
There is, of course, a valid argument that the liability insurance
policyholder could never “profit” from the insurance proceeds because the
insurance proceeds go to the third party accident victim, not the
policyholder. Because the wealth protection purpose of insurance can
compete with the compensation function of insurance in the liability
insurance context, the public policy rationale for the criminal act fortuity
clause is weakened. The historical nature of the clause, arising out of
moral and public policy concerns, does not port well into the modern
liability insurance landscape. It functions, as has been shown, as a very
nearly always unbalanced concept whereby so much law and policy mash
together and the result of which is very often a compensation gap for an
injured accident victim.
The simplest solution to fairly and predictably balance concerns
with the compensation gap while still maintaining efficacy of fortuity
clauses as written is to interpret fortuity clauses as clauses that are triggered
by fortuity concerns which frustrate the insurance relationship. To do
anything else is to introduce unpredictability in the form of morality-based
mutable legal concepts from tort and criminal law into an insurance
80
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interpretation exercise. To that end, the intentional act fortuity clause
should be interpreted so as to remove coverage for a loss only when the
policyholder subjectively intends to bring about the harm that was caused
by the intentional act. Similarly, the criminal act fortuity clause should
only oust coverage for a loss when a policyholder subjectively intends the
harm that was caused by the criminal act. Otherwise, coverage would be
removed for fortuitous losses at the expense of an injured accident victim’s
compensatory needs. By interpreting these clauses as requiring a
subjective causative element, the exercise restricts coverage removal to
only those instances where the policyholder could actually subjectively
have altered behavior to avoid the loss, thereby ensuring maximum
effectiveness for moral hazard insurance concerns. Otherwise, the
deterrent effect (if any) of the clause is ineffective and over-broad. This
sort of approach would prevent fortuity clauses from inefficiently morphing
into morality clauses. It would also more fairly balance the wealth
protection aspect of insurance with the compensatory needs of accident
victims while still not doing violence to the current language of the
respective clauses. Litigation and insurance costs would be saved as a
result. The compensation gap for fortuity victims would significantly
narrow to predictably include only those harmed by specific-intent crimes
or subjective intentional conduct on the part of the policyholder. While this
still would leave some victims without compensation, it would at least
provide a fixed category of people so that a sensible social solution could
then be crafted, if necessary.
VIII.

ADDRESSING THE COMPENSATION GAP

To address the remaining compensatory gap, it would be necessary
to go further than what can be done by interpreting the presently worded
insurance policies through a lens of fortuity. One must examine the web of
accident compensation as it is presently constituted and perhaps reform it.
There may well be reason to do this, as the injured victims comprising this
particular gap would be those who were injured as a result of particularly
extreme intentional or criminal actions on the part of the policyholder: the
victims of assaults, attempted murders, actual murders and sexual
assaults.81 This group of victims would likely exhibit particularly
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catastrophic and troubling injuries that, under tort, would typically be
deserving of a significant level of compensation. As Rick Swedloff and
Jennifer Wriggins point out, to ignore these victims in the compensatory
gap is not only expensive, but doing so impinges on collective social
conscience as well. A few solutions exist.
One solution would be to incentivize insurers to market an add-on
portion for a variety of liability insurance policies specifically designed to
pay the policyholder in the event she is injured by another party and cannot
collect from that party’s liability insurance because of the operation of a
fortuity clause in that other party’s policy. The add-on “fortuity clause
insurance” could function similar to uninsured automobile motorist
coverage, as an extra endorsement or rider on automobile, homeowners,
personal, professional, or commercial liability insurance. For an additional
premium, the policyholder could claim compensation from her own
liability insurance policy if she found herself without compensation due to
an inability to trigger a tortfeasor’s liability insurance because of the
conduct of the tortfeasor wrongdoer who harmed her.82 The risk of being
found in the compensation gap due to the operation of a fortuity clause
could be unbundled and sold as a separate insurance add-on.83 While the
payout under this type of insurance add-on may not be small when it
occurs, it is certainly a very proscribed situation far less likely to occur than
a standard automobile accident or any mishap that triggers homeowners
insurance.
In fact, its instance of trigger might be quite rare,
comparatively. There may be a real market in this add-on, to the benefit of
insurers, because people have a somewhat irrational fear of being harmed
by crime. If offered at a modest price, most policyholders might well
purchase it.
Of course, this solution only benefits those who are covered by
liability insurance in the first place. While the group would be obviously
large and include all drivers and homeowners, some particularly vulnerable
members of society are simply not covered by any liability insurance.
These are most often the poor, the unemployed, or those who lose liability
perpetrator); Swedloff, supra note 36 (documenting the challenging compensatory
issues with fortuity victims).
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insurance coverage for another reason (like failing to pay their premiums).
For those, another solution would have to be invented if they, too, are to
exit the compensatory gap left by the unpredictable application of fortuity
clauses.
There are two potential solutions to address the needs of this still
smaller group of uncompensated accident victims who are not themselves
covered by liability insurance and who did not purchase the first party
fortuity clause insurance add-on. In the face of a triggered fortuity clause,
liability insurers could be legislatively forced to provide compensation to
the victims of criminal and intentional conduct.84 In exchange, insurers
would be allowed to subrogate against their own policyholders in an
attempt to recoup their losses from the actual wrongdoer. This provides at
least some credence to the operation of the fortuity clause. However, the
actual success of that subrogation exercise is speculative. If we know that
most policyholders do not have sufficient personal assets to cover a civil
judgment, why would insurer subrogation against an insured produce any
better results? There would be substantial collection costs on the part of
insurers, for somewhat sketchy proceeds as a result of the exercise.
Another solution to assist uninsured individuals who are left with
no compensation as a result of a policyholder’s triggered fortuity clause is
for the government to create a new socialized compensation mechanism for
these victims – a “Victims of Intentional Harm” program. Some
government body would operate a program that steps in to compensate
those left in the gaps created by fortuity clauses. The program would be
funded by a small levy on the sale of every liability insurance policy. This
is essentially the same as insurers providing add-on fortuity clause
insurance except mandated in a socialized fashion. It would be paid for by
all policyholders but would be accessed by those who could not access
some other compensation source (i.e. those who did not have add-on
fortuity clause insurance). If the private market add-on fortuity clause
insurance failed in that it was not purchased by sufficient policyholders,
this may be a workable alternative to that solution as well. The
government body could also be given the right to subrogate against a
wrongdoer, if any assets were attainable. Of course, there would be
administrative costs to the program and the difficulty of determining the
84
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price of the levy on the sale of liability insurance policies. But one would
expect the cost of operation to be at a minimum due to the limited amount
of victims who would have to resort to the fund, especially if there were
some reasonable limits on compensation provided by the fund.
Finally, a more fundamental solution to fortuity clauses would be
to legislatively outlaw fortuity clauses in liability insurance. This step
places the compensatory purpose of insurance squarely at the forefront,
well ahead of the wealth protection purpose. It enshrines private insurance
as a fundamental part of the accident compensation system. However, it
also passes the costs of paying for non-fortuitous losses onto all liability
insurance policyholders. Providing coverage for losses certain to occur
appears counter to standard insurance risk fundamentals and, frankly,
insurance profitability.
But such a move is not impossible.85 Indeed, in Canada, the
decision was made to disallow fortuity clauses in automobile liability
insurance, such that any act of automobile use, no matter how criminal or
intentional, results in compensation for the accident victim via the
wrongdoer’s liability insurance policy.86 The result has been that the costs
of these allegedly certain losses are spread amongst the risk pool of insured
drivers. While premiums may have increased as a result, automobile
insurance is not catastrophically unaffordable in that country. The policy
move was to favor victim compensation over wealth protection or even
fortuity concepts in the auto accident sphere. Driving was considered a
dangerous activity and the driving public would have to self-fund a source
of victim compensation within a liability insurance market.
The real question here is this: if such was the thinking for the
victims of automobile insurance accidents, why is there not similar thinking
going on for the victims of crimes and other intentional acts? Is the move
from auto victim to assault victim really so fundamentally different that the
former is more deserving of a compensation scheme whereas the latter is
not? Or is it simply because it is more administratively easy to create a
compensation scheme with a pool of risk-creators like automobile drivers
85
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who would be more comfortable to pay into such a scheme for the privilege
of operating a dangerous motor vehicle? If that is the case, then why is
auto accident risk creation different than any other risk creation behavior
covered by homeowners or commercial liability insurance policies?
IX.

CONCLUSION

Keeping fortuity clauses firmly grounded in fortuity-based thinking
would help to restrict whatever compensation gap does exist for fortuity
victims injured by fortuitous losses. That means that the intentional act and
criminal act fortuity clauses require a subjective interpretation. Morality
needs to be taken out of the equation. That would also save significant
litigation costs in the solving of fortuity clause insurance coverage disputes.
Those fortuity victims still left in the compensation gap would be a smaller,
more predictable group to be expected in keeping with the principle of
fortuity in insurance. But the situation is no less tragic. In a society which
relies so heavily on private, market-based insurance as the main
compensatory source for accident victims, it is surprising that, of all
victims, these fortuity victims frequently have the least options for
compensation. Some other solution for them is required.
Such a solution, or indeed any solutions proposed in this final
section, would require not only insurer buy-in, but serious political buy-in
as well. They are social solutions to a social problem. Such change is
never easy. Staid institutions would have to change. But it is important to
keep in mind that the genesis of these fortuity clauses in the first place was
a concern over social problems. These clauses designed to circumvent
morality problems associated with insurance products are now themselves
causing other morality problems in the form of unfairly and unpredictably
leaving a serious and expensive compensation gap in society for a sub-set
of injured accident victims. Perhaps then the argument that insurers need
to be part of the social solution is a reasonable one. It is a social move that
will require a shift in thinking from the purpose of insurance as wealth
protection to that of victim compensation. This Article has outlined the
importance of balancing that tension. Perhaps that shift is not as difficult to
make in today’s society as it was when liability insurance first surfaced.

